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CURRENT DECISIONS
ARBITRATION AND AWARD-INsRANcE POLICY-AGREEMENT FOR bETERMINATION
OF DAMAGE NOT AGREEMENT TO ARixRAT.-It was provided in a standard ire
insurance policy that if any disagreement should arise over the amount of loss it
should be determined by appraisers. Loss occuried, and the plaintiff sought to
force compliance with the provision under the N. Y. Arbitration Law (Laws of
192o, ch. 275, sec. 4). The defendant appealed from an order; to so arbitrate.
Held, that'the clause which does not authorize the appraisers to pass upon the
question of the whole liability, but restricts them to the xiuount of loss, dbes not
constitute an agreement to arbitrate. American Ins. Co. v. Wasserman (1924,
App. Div. ist Dept.) 71 N Y. L. JouR. lO49.
The weight of authority agrees that such a clause calls merely for an appraisal
and not an arbitration. Townsend v. Greenwich Ins. Co. (1903, 2d Dept.) 86
App. Div. 323, 83 N. Y. Supp. 909; NOTES (1922) 8 CORN. L. QUAiT. 53; contra:
Western Assurance Co. v. Hall & Bro. (1895) i12 Ala. 318, 20 So. 447." How-
ever, the test for an arbitration which this court reiterates, and which is first to
be found in the reporter's note. to Elmendorf v. Harris (183o, N. Y. Senate) 5
Wend. 522, materially destroys the value of the Arbitration Law. There seems
to be no reason why a controversy should not be settled by arbitration under the
statute whether it leaves open the question of ultimate liability or not. Hamilton
v. Home Ins. Co. (189o) 137 U. S. 370, II Sup. Ct. 133; cf. Western Assurance
Co. v. Hall & Bro., supra; Morse, Arbitration and Award (1872) 40.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DEcLARATORY JUDGMENT-UNIFORM Acr.-A will
devised real estate to the executrix to be managed and used by her for herself
and her children with power to sell if in her judgment necessary. Her absolute
discretion in the premises free from control by the courts was contested by her
son. She filed a bill praying a declaratory judgment construing the will. The
defendant denied the constitutionality of the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act.
The lower court dismissed the bill. Held, that the declaration be made. Miller V.
Miller (1924, Tenn.) 261 S. W. 965.
This is the first construction of the constitutionality of the Uniform Declaratory
Judgment Act. The constitutionality of the declaratory judgment has been
previously established. State, ex rel. Hopkins, Attorney-General, v. Grove (I92i)
I09 Kan. 619, 2oi Pac. 82; Blakeslee v. Wilson (1923) igo Calif. 479, 213 Pac.
495; NOTE AND COMMENT (I922) 20 MIcH. -L. REV. 436; COMMENTS (92-2) 31
YALE LAW JOURNAL,. 419; (1923) 33 ibid., io5. See generally, Borchard, The
Declaratory Judgmeht-A Needed Procedural Reform (i918) 28 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, I, 105.
COPYRIGHTS-RADIO BROADCASTING NOT INFRINGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT.-The
Copyright Act of March 4, 1909 (35 Stat at L. 1075) as amended Aug. 24, 1912
(37 Stat at L. 489) provides that any person entitled thereto,' upbn compliance
with the provisions of the act, be given the exclusive right to perforffi the copy-
righted work publicly for profit if it be a musical composition for that purpose..
The plaintiff owners of a copyrighted song sought to enjoin the defendant, a
manufacturer of radio receiving sets and parts, from broadcasting the song from
a station maintained and operated by the defendant as a part of its business-.
The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint. Held, that the complaint be
dismissed, as such broadcasting did not constitute a "public perforinance for
profit" within the meaning of the act. Remick & Co. v. American Automobile
Accessories Co. (i924, S. D. Ohio) 298 Fed. 628.
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The purpose of copyright acts, as shown by their historical development, makes
them essentially a monopolistic influence. Holdsworth, Press Control and Copy-
right in the i6th and x7th Centuries (192o) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 841; Herbert
v. Shanley Co. (1917) 242 U. S. 591, 37 Sup. Ct. 232. The act, therefore, must
be given a liberal construction if its purpose is to be accomplished. M. Whitmark
& Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co. (1923, D. N. J.) 291 Fed. 776; Harms v. Cohen
(1922, E. D. Pa-) 279 Fed. 276; (1924) 24 COL. L. REv. go; (1924) 72 U. PA.
L. REV. 190. The court in the instant case seems unfortunately to have been led
into an over strict construction of the act due to the dictionary definition method
of construing the words used.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-POwER To BoRaow MoNEY INCLuDEs PowER TO
ISSUE NEGOTIABLE BONDS.-The plaintiff, a taxpayer, sought a declaratory judg-
ment on the power of the defendant school district to issue negotiable bonds and
for an injunction restraining such issue. The school district had power to tax
and to borrow moniey under the act of incorporation. The lower court adviscd
for the power to issue the bonds, but reserved opinion. Held, -that a declaratory
judgment be given in favor of such power. Russell v. Middletown City School
District (1924, Conn.) 125 AtI. 64L
The majority of courts refuse to imply a power to issue negotiable bonds,
which are not subject to "equitable defenses," and thus leave the municipal corpo-
ration to a less readily marketable ack~nowledgment of indebtedness. Brenham v.
Gervman-American Bank (1892) 144 U. S. 173, 12 Sup. Ct 559; First National
Bank v. Nye County (1914) 38 Nev. 123, 145 Pac. 932; 5 McQuillan, Municipal
Corporations (1913) 4815; 2 Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th ed. 1911) 1325.
The instant case is one of first impression in Connecticut and accords with the
rule implying from the power to borrow money, the power to use the most effective
and practical means therefor. Jones v. Guilford County (1923) 185 N. C. 303,
117 S. E. 37; cf. Hackett, The Supreme Court and Municipal Bonds (1892) 6
HARV. L. Rev. 73.
SURETYSHI1-GUARANTY OF PAST INDEBTEDNESS BY PRINCIPAL DEBTOR.-One
Parker, a retail merchant, induced the defendants to become sureties for his past
and future indebtedness to the plaintiff by falsely representing that, at the time
they signd the guaranty in his renewal contract, he was not indebted to the
plaintiff. The plaintif sued the defendants for the amount due both before and
after the signing. From a judgment dismissing the action, the plaintiff appealed.
Held, that since Parker was the agent of the plaintiff -as to the misrepresentation,
the defendants need pay only the debt incurred by Parker after the signing.
W. T. Razoleigh Co. v. Warren et al. (1924, S. D.) 198 N. W. 555.
Fraudulent misrepresentations of material facts made by a principal debtor to
a surety do not affect the surety's liability to the creditor. Knapp & Co. v. Wilks
(1912) 1O5 Ark. 243, 151 S. W. 280; Watkins Medicine Co. v. Hargett (1923,
Ala.) 95 So. 811; Ann. Cas. ig6 A, 5ol, note; Spencer, Suretyship .(1913) 75. But
Misrepresentation of a material fact by a creditor or his agent is a good defense
to a surety. Milan Bank.v. Richmond (911) 235 Mo. 532, 139'S. W. 352;
Johnson Farm Loan Co. v. McManigal (1923, C. C. A. 8th) 288 Fed. 185; (1919)
28 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 410. On the facts of the instant case it is difficult to
justify the court's assumption that Parker was acting as the agent of the plaintiff
in securing the guaranty. Saginaw Medicine Co. v. Batey (914) 179 Mich. 651,
146 N. W. 329.
